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SPEECH PLATFORMS
Abner S. Greenet
The state plays different roles, and free speech doctrine should
(and sometimes does) respect these roles. We properly insist (with
some categorical exceptions) that the state not regulate private speech
based on subject matter or point of view. If private speakers want to
praise the Nazis or condemn homosexuality, the state has no place
stopping them, even if firmly convinced these ideas are wrong. Why
we have such firm protection for speech we abhor is a matter of much
debate. To some extent, it's because we don't trust the state to make
content-based judgments consistently as a matter of principle; we fear
that too often it will be merely playing favorites, helping friends and
harming enemies. One thing we know is that the state holds a
monopoly over legitimate coercive force, and that when it jails or
fines, it possesses the ability to squelch speech, and not merely
channel it to another outlet.
We have similarly strict rules against the state's drawing contentbased lines in public places where people have traditionally gathered.
We may build streets primarily for ease of movement and parks
primarily for recreation, but citizens also use both to meet and discuss
matters of the day, to face ideas with which they may not be familiar
(and sometimes find quite odd). We can always walk by or away from
such speech, so we are never captive in these settings. Even if streets
and parks are technically "owned" by the state and not by private
capital, they are held as a kind of public trust. (That the state is really
"we the people" acting via delegation can't get us very far; exploding
the public/private line in this sense would raise difficulties in any area
of free speech law, regarding whether the state is acting in a
sovereign/regulatory or some other capacity.) We have made a
collective decision-perhaps in part to ensure that not only the
wealthy have adequate avenues for their ideas-to reserve some
property as space where the state may not regulate speech based on
content.

t Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to Caroline Corbin,
Jessie Hill, John Nagle, Mark Patterson, Geof Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants in the
Fordhan Law School Faculty Scholarship Retreat for helpful comments.
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On the other end of the spectrum, the state sometimes speaks itself.
Some examples are obvious and it is just as obvious that free speech
doctrine is out of place. So, when the President promotes his agenda
or critiques his opponents, he may make whatever content-based
statements he likes. Similarly, when the FDA announces warnings
regarding a food or drug, it may say what it believes to be true,
without giving equal time for the opposing point of view. The state,
through these actors, may be advancing content-based, contested
positions--even points of view-but we know there are ample
opportunities in other fora for disagreement to be stated. Neither a
regulatory monopoly nor state control over property held in trust for
public gathering is involved here.
The state also speaks for itself in more disguised ways, and we
generally are fine with it making content-based judgments there as
well. Often this involves conditional funding, and the conditions often
turn on speech content. If the state wants to promote childbirth (and
possible adoption) over abortion, it may do so, whether it is speaking
directly (say, through an official's speech to a group) or indirectly
(say, through funding a clinic that agrees to follow these rules).
Perhaps we should require that the state's role in such selective
funding be transparent at every level, most importantly (in this
example) to the women receiving the health services. But such
selective funding neither coerces private choice nor dominates the
market for the relevant speech. (I am assuming in this example that
abortion-related information is otherwise available to the women who
seek clinic help. In addition to improving accountability, the
transparency concern helps ensure that the women seeking clinic help
appreciate they may not be getting standard, purely professional,
medical advice, but rather are getting the state's version; this will
make it easier for them to appreciate that there may be other sources
to which they must turn for other points of view.) Or consider if the
state wants to fund the arts. It might not want to do so by lottery, but
rather fund art it considers worthy of being backed by taxpayer
money. This sort of judgment will inevitably involve attention to
content. Perhaps the taxpayers want to fund only paintings of dogs or
sunsets; or perhaps they don't want to fund art they find disgusting.
Determining what counts as disgusting will involve attention to
content. But we're talking about taxpayer dollars only; painters will
still be able to produce, display, and sell disgusting art.
In these ways, we permit a great deal of content-based selectivity
when the state acts via direct speech or conditional spending, rather
than through regulating. And the selectivity may be based on subject
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matter or on viewpoint. The former is clear. The latter seems harder,
but is also clear. When we permit state conditional funding for "we
encourage you to carry your child to term" but refuse such funding
for "here are abortion alternatives," we are permitting a viewpoint
distinction. When we permit a government agency to award arts
grants only to work that is not indecent, we are permitting a set of
case by case viewpoint distinctions. Indecency as a category isn't
obviously viewpoint-based, because it is in large part about taste and
what seems disgusting or revolting. This kind of aesthetic judgment is
hard to cubby-hole in our free speech doctrine. But if the underlying
purpose of the limitation is to refuse taxpayer dollars for art that
challenges mainstream sensibility via certain types of sexual images
or images related to bodily functions, that desire to preserve
mainstream values is similar to what happens when we fund a
preferred viewpoint on a contested issue over another.
That we permit content-based selectivity when the state acts as
funder has nothing to do with the limited amount of funds available.
We could insist on a lottery. We permit it because we want the state,
acting in our name, to endorse some speech as good and refuse to
give its endorsement to other speech. We don't live in the type of
liberal democracy that would be strictly neutral (if such a thing were
possible) as to the good. Because we insist on strict rules for
regulation of private speech and for certain types of state-owned
property (streets and parks), we can preserve a robust, freewheeling
speech marketplace in many arenas. The state as speaker and sponsor
or patron of speech can act as the collective voice of the citizens. (I'm
assuming a reductionist view of what we want, via a reductionist view
of how majoritarian democracy works.) We get the best of both
worlds-the world of public debate unfettered by the state and the
world of state-sponsored speech that pushes some and not other views
of the good.
That the state may be selectively advancing a contested view of the
good does not entail that it is adopting the speech as its own, nor that
it is correct to attribute the speech to the state. Artists who receive
National Endowment for the Arts grants are not necessarily advancing
the view of the U.S. government; all we know is they are speaking
within the range of acceptable taxpayer-funded ideas. And what about
privately donated monuments that a municipality chooses to erect in a
city park? It's one thing to say when a private homeowner erects a
monument on her lawn, she expects viewers to attribute the speech to
her, and they are likely to do so. This isn't true for monuments on
city-owned property. It all depends on local understandings, perhaps
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developed over time. Maybe the town park used to be a graveyard for
a rich family, and their old tombstones are still up. Maybe the town
park has a history of rotating monuments, placed via lottery. Maybe it
has a limited number of monuments, which have gone up in fits and
starts over the years. Even in the latter case, it seems unlikely that the
average passerby (with or without knowledge of local history) will
attribute the content of the monument to the city. Here's a better way
to look at it: The city wants to provide a platform for some ideas and
not others. It's not regulating, and it's not setting rules for transient
speech in the park. It wants to be able to erect a Rotary Club
monument and not erect a Nazi Skinhead Club monument. We should
treat this no differently from how we treat the state's funding the
National Endowment for Democracy but refusing to fund a National
Endowment for Totalitarian Dictatorship, although the Endowment
example may properly be one of government speech, whereas the
Club example is better termed one of providing a platform for private
speech. When we let the state make content-based judgments in these
settings--even viewpoint-based judgments-the state, acting as
sponsor or patron of private speech, is selectively shaping the content
of what may be transmitted from state-provided speech platforns.
Some of the messages will seem bland and pablum-like (who could
disagree with a monument to the longtime coach of the multichampionship high school football team?) but sometimes not (say, a
monument to a certain war, in a town with many pacifists who oppose
war generally and many non-pacifists who opposed this specific war).
Again, the state isn't preventing opposing views from being
vigorously aired.
If the state opens a new park, it has to play by the rules of parks
generally, i.e., no content-based speech regulation. Analogues to
parks should be treated similarly. Although it's a bit of a harder
question, if the state opens a municipal auditorium with an all-comers
policy, the all-comers may (and must) include groups many of us find
odious (so long as they play by content-neutral time, place, and
manner rules). But this gets significantly harder if we alter a few
facts-what if the state is acting as a public university, and
administering student activity fees for student publications? Should
we permit the state no content-based leeway? (I put aside obvious
permissible distinctions such as "student groups only.") For example,
if the establishment clause is properly read to permit state funding for
student religious speech (so long as funds go to secular speech as
well), then there is no good reason to forbid funds for such
publications. (The concern that the state might be perceived as
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endorsing the religious views disappears as both a constitutional and
policy matter once we determine that a reasonable viewer should see
the state as setting up a platform for private speech of various kinds,
neither endorsing nor condemning any of it.) But does that mean the
university must authorize funds for the We Hate Black People
magazine? Why? Because we think that idea may be a good one, and
needs its space in the marketplace of ideas? Because we are afraid
that if we permit the school to draw this line, we will have to allow it
total discretion? Once we are past the basic contours of streets and
parks, we should permit the state to make content-based restrictions
when it makes available speech platforms-via space or funding-if
there are good reasons to do so. Now, you might say: Isn't a core
concern of free speech doctrine that the state can't make (or should be
disabled from making) reasoned judgments regarding speech content
(whether acting in its initial policymaking mode or its judicial review
mode)? And I would say: In part that's true, and that's why we
cordon off regulation of private speech and some public property in
this way. But otherwise, we want the state to make judgments of
what's good and bad. Sometimes the state will be speaking when so
doing; other times it will be providing (or not) a platform for private
speech.
There are many good reasons for the state to open speech
platforms while imposing content-based limits. The platforms in
question here may be numerous-the public college student
publications I mentioned above, ads on public buses and subways,
vanity license plates, adopt-a-highway signs, and others. So, for
example, perhaps the state wants to permit advertising for various
products and services in its subways and buses, but avoid potential
controversy from permitting candidate advertising for political office.
True, political speech generally is more highly valued than other
speech; but here we'd be permitting all the private political speech
(and streets/parks political speech) that the candidates can muster.
What we'd be saying is that it's a legitimate concern that the average
bus rider might mistakenly think the state is endorsing a candidate
whose sign is up (when another's isn't). Or that it's a legitimate
concern that better-funded candidates will find a kind of captive
audience (especially among those citizens who for various reasons
have to take public transportation). How about a state-run candidate
forum, limited to candidates who are currently polling above a certain
percentage? If the justification is that debates work better with a small
number of candidates on stage (and isn't simply a clever way for
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those in power to favor their friends), then we should permit the
limitation.
The state should also have the power to refuse to open platforms to
speech that offends core, commonly held values grounded in our
commitment to equal protection of the laws. Examples here could
include: no vanity license plates that disparage persons on the basis of
race and other protected characteristics; no funding for student groups
that do the same; refusal to allow the KKK to adopt a section of the
highway and say so on a highway sign. Although the state has an
interest in avoiding having such speech misattributed to it, the
concern is not (or not primarily) about misattribution. Rather, the
state's primary concern is to set up speech platforms without
providing the opportunity for some persons or groups to cause
message-based harm to other persons or groups based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or other
characteristics on the basis of which we think it proper to offer people
protection.
That there are good reasons to refuse platforms for hate speechwhether the speech itself reads as hateful or whether the group itself
is understood as adopting principles of hate or disparagement-is
indisputable. Core free speech doctrine nonetheless protects hate
speech in part to ensure an open marketplace for the exchange of
ideas; this may provide a peaceful outlet for odious ideas and may
allow such ideas to be proven false. There are also arguments based in
democratic theory or individual autonomy. But we can protect those
underlying free speech values by permitting hateful, disparaging
speech by private actors on their own turf and nickel, and by offering
them the turf of streets and parks as common meeting grounds.
Having done so, we can cordon off other state-provided speech
platforms from such speech-as an extension of the idea that the
government itself may be content-selective in its own speech.
Refusing platforms to speech the state deems offensive to core values
of equality will require it to draw some tricky lines, based on the
viewpoint of the message or the group. For example, the state might
prevent a subway ad that says "Jews Are Horrible People" but permit
one that preaches tolerance for all religions. These are clearly
viewpoint-based judgments that we refuse the state when it regulates
private speech or when it administers streets and parks. In part we do
so because we don't want the state skewing the discourse; in part
because we don't think the state can draw clear lines in these settings,
or can draw lines without playing favorites in a way that serves no
valid public purpose. My proposal is that we should run these risks
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for state-created speech platforms in a way we refuse to run them
when the state regulates private speech or administers streets and
parks. The values the state is protecting are significant, and ought to
have an arena of private speech in which they prevail.
The same arguments should hold for sexual or vulgar speech. Here
the viewpoint-discrimination concern is less, because it's less clear
that refusing to permit a "FUCK YOU" vanity license plate or a Porn
Club at the local high school is a viewpoint-based judgment. But
whether it is or not, sexual or vulgar speech-although protected in
the private and streets/parks arenas-is sufficiently offensive to most
people that the state should be allowed to protect such sensibilities by
not offering new speech opportunities for the offense.
I am not suggesting, though, that we should permit the state to
make viewpoint-based distinctions of any sort whatsoever when it
sets up speech platforms. In particular, it may not open a platform for
one side only in a currently contested matter. This is so even if it may
use its own speech to promote one side over another. So, although it
may promote childbirth over abortion, it may not permit a "RIGHTTO-LIFE" vanity license plate while refusing the "PRO-CHOICE"
plate. Although it may spend money promoting climate change
legislation, it may not permit the student environmental club to meet
after hours while refusing to permit a club to meet that denies human
agency in increased carbon emissions. And so on. Here is where the
distinction between government speech and state-provided speech
platforms matters. If the state is willing to claim speech as its own,
then it may participate in debate without giving equal time to the
other side. But if it is merely setting up platforms for private speech,
then it forfeits the government speech mantle, and its reasons for
making viewpoint distinctions change. To provide a speech platform
for one side but not the other in a current debate should be seen as
improper skewing of the speech marketplace. To provide a speech
platform for the religious tolerance group but not the group that hates
a specific sect also skews debate, but we should deem protection
against disparagement a trumping value, at least in the setting of
state-provided speech platforms.
The state should, though, be permitted to exclude all sides of a
currently contested controversy, i.e., to make subject-matter rather
than viewpoint distinctions in these settings. So although it may not
permit only one or the other vanity license plate in the abortion
controversy, it may refuse to authorize vanity plates on the entire
issue. The legitimate state interest isn't avoiding improper attribution
of one message or another to the state, and it's not refusing to provide
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a platform for hateful or vulgar messages. Rather, it's the (somewhat
weaker) state interest in shunting debate on controversial issues to the
private or streets/parks arenas, and keeping other state-provided
speech platforms for more mainstream, uncontested matters. There's
a close analogy to the state's power as sponsor or patron of private
speech to track mainstream taxpayer sensibility and avoid
controversy. (For what it's worth, although I would encourage the
state to refuse platforms for hate speech and vulgarity, I don't have a
strong feeling regarding whether the state should refuse platforms for
controversial subject matter. My argument above is that such refusal
should be considered constitutional.)
The Court's opinions on religious speech in schools, when the
state has opened space for speech and then refused it for religious
speech, are consistent with my approach. To some extent, the state
actors in question just had a misguided view of the establishment
clause. They thought that if a school permits a religious study or
worship group into a space otherwise opened for speech, then the
state might be unconstitutionally advancing or endorsing religion. But
it wouldn't be, for it would be correct to see the state not as
promoting the religious views in question (although one could
imagine a case in which that would be true, and thus constitutionally
problematic), but rather as providing a platform for religious speech
on equal terms with other speech. And there's no good reason not to
provide such a platform; religious speech, as such, is a core part of the
U.S. fabric, and the state has no legitimate argument against it based
on content. It would be a mistake to read this line of cases, however,
as extending to a broader, content-neutral rule for how the state must
manage platforms it creates for private speech. The doctrine says the
state may make reasonable content-based decisions here; that fits my
argument. It also says the state may not make viewpoint-based
decisions here; that doesn't fit my argument. But apart from the
religion setting, there are no Court holdings (as opposed to dicta) to
the contrary of my position permitting some viewpoint-based
distinctions in state-created speech platforms (again, treating
separately streets/parks and perhaps some close analogues). True, in
most of the religious speech cases, the Court viewed the restriction on
such speech in the public school/college setting as viewpoint-based,
and thus invalid. But the better argument is that the restrictions on
religious speech-better put, the refusal to provide a platform for
religious speech-had no good justification. That they were
viewpoint-based was a red herring, not the real reason they were
invalid; or put another way, they were illegitimately viewpoint-based,
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leaving open the possibility of legitimate viewpoint-based distinctions
in this setting. This line of cases doesn't hold that once a school opens
after-school classroom space, an auditorium, or student activities
money for some speech, then it must open such space or provide such
funds on a viewpoint-neutral basis. That is, there is no holding that
says the school has to permit the "We Hate Black People" or "Nazi
Party" group to have equal access.
Let's turn, finally, to antidiscrimination norms in the setting of
state-created speech platforms. The state may not itself disparage
people based on race (put aside whether one would have a cause of
action for such disparagement). And it may not sponsor speech that
does so. A more limited version of this argument would suggest that,
at least, the state may choose to not so disparage persons, and may
choose to not provide platforms for such disparagement. Thus, if a
state law school chooses to provide meeting space and activities funds
for student groups generally, but not for groups that espouse hatred of
persons based on race, the law school is acting according to a
legitimate public purpose. It shouldn't matter if the protected
characteristic has been deemed to trigger strict or intermediate
scrutiny; those are rules for limiting judicial review of legislative
action, and not rules that should bind the policy maker itself. If there
is a good reason (yes, we will have to judge it) for deeming a
trait/characteristic in need of state protection, then that is a good
reason for the state to refuse a platform for disparaging speech on the
basis of such a characteristic. Thus, a state law school may refuse a
platform for antigay speech, even if sexual orientation has not (yet)
been treated with elevated scrutiny by the Court. I note again that
private speech may not be regulated on this basis.
What about regulation of associations based not on their speech
but on their exclusionary decisions based on certain characteristics,
say, sexual orientation? A state law school must permit a group-say,
a religious one that has a negative view about homosexuality-to
exist and its members to associate, even if that involves exclusion
from membership and/or leadership to gays and lesbians. This rule is
but an offshoot of our freedom of association rules generally-the
state may not insist that such groups change their internal practices.
But if the state is providing speech and associational opportunitiessay, activities funds or announcements in the school's weekly
newsletter or bulletin board space or a school e-mail address or
meeting space or use of the school's name and logo-then it may
choose to advance the view of the good it (justifiably, if not
necessarily) believes to be true, and refuse these platforms to groups
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that do not treat gays and lesbians equally. Is this viewpoint
discrimination? That's a hard question. If the school refused to permit
the group to speak its views regarding homosexuality, that would be
viewpoint discrimination, and illegitimate (as regulation of private
speech). If it refused to sponsor such views as part of a general
opening of space or funds, that would also be viewpoint
discrimination, but justifiable, as I argued above. If it refuses to
sponsor groups on the ground that such groups have exclusionary
membership/leadership rules based on sexual orientation, that might
not properly be considered viewpoint discrimination, because it's
based on conduct, not on speech. But whether or not we properly
deem the school's decision one based on viewpoint, it's defensible
(and constitutional) because (a) it doesn't regulate private speech or
association, and (b) it advances a legitimate (although contested) view
of the good, namely, the equality of persons regardless of sexual
orientation. Other public law schools might take a different view,
permitting space and funds for groups (religious or otherwise) that
don't support the equality of gays and lesbians. Unless we consider
the equal protection argument to be of the strong version, forbidding
the state from sponsoring such groups, we should deem the matter
optional, for each school to make its own determination about the
view of the good it wishes to advance.

Here is what I have argued in this essay: The state acts in many
different ways. Sometimes it seeks to create platforms for private
speech. Acting in this capacity, the state is neither regulating private
speech nor speaking itself. Nor is it administering traditional places
for people to gather, associate, and speak such as streets and parks.
The state has good reasons for refusing to provide speech platforms
for hateful or vulgar speech. This is not about the fear of improper
attribution of such messages to the state. Rather, the state's interests
are protecting persons from the sting of hateful speech based on
characteristics we consider morally and politically irrelevant, such as
race, and, to a lesser extent, protecting persons from the sting of
vulgar or sexually indecent speech. These are values we forbid the
state from advancing via regulation of private speech. But just as the
state may advance these values through its own speech, so may it
advance them via selective exclusion from state-created speech
platforms. The risk of favoritism and unprincipled line-drawing-a
key reason to insist on strong free speech protection when the state is
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regulating or administering streets and parks-should take a back seat
to the protection of core, commonly held values when the state is
setting up and administering new opportunities for private speech.'

I I have alluded to the following Supreme Court cases in this essay, in the order cited:
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (deeming streets and parks public fora for
First Amendment purposes); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding an abortioncounseling "gag rule" for projects receiving federal funding for family planning); Nat'l
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding an indecency restriction in
federal arts funding); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (upholding a
city's refusal to erect the monument of a religious sect in a public park); Perry Ed. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (describing the basic doctrinal trifurcation of
traditional public forums, designated public forums, and limited public forums); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (invalidating a state university's refusal
to allocate student activity funds for a Christian newspaper); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding a city's refusal to open public transit
advertising space for political ads, even though it allowed advertising on other subjects); Ark.
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding a state-owned public
television station's exclusion of a candidate with low public support from a debate); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (invalidating a public university's refusal to grant meeting space
to a religious group); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (invalidating a public school district's refusal to grant meeting space to a church group);
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (invalidating a public school's
refusal to grant meeting space to a Christian children's club); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding a state law school's refusal to provide school funds and other
support to a religious student group that refused full membership status to those who did not
share the group's views on sexual orientation).
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53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69
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N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment,
15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981); Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads:Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities
Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357 (2001); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public
Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113 (2010);
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151
(1996); Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299
(2009); Geoffrey R. Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233;
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L.
REv. 1919 (2006); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).

